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Valerie Traub
One reason why orgasm might be, as Annamarie Jagose says, “good to think 
with” (2013, 36), is that its invitation to train critical attention on actual sex 
practices reveals the impasses of sexual knowledge. As snapshots of its twentieth-
century fortunes unfold in the retrospective album that comprises Orgasmology, 
orgasm is shown to pose problems not only of representation and politics, signi-
fication and affect, but of what it means to know sex. Far from being the site of 
truth, of subjective authenticity, of empirical realness, orgasm, in Jagose’s terms, 
is an “irregular and unpredictable formation” (9) that opens onto the incoher-
ence and obscurity, at once conceptual and visceral, of sex itself. Bringing us 
resolutely back to what we do not know, and perhaps cannot know, in the history 
and experiences of sex and sexuality, orgasm is not only a critical object—or, in 
Jagose’s oft-used phrase, a critical figure—but an epistemological conundrum.
Taking the obscurity of sexual knowledge as axiomatic, I propose that 
the intractability of orgasm as an object of inquiry can contribute to a con-
sideration of what it might mean to think sex, not only as an issue of and for 
queer theory—one of Jagose’s manifest concerns—but as a problem of method. 
Queer studies has a number of strong theories from which practitioners derive 
their post-humanism and anti-foundationalism, anti-identitarianism and anti-
normativity, anti-teleology and anti-sociality, as well as their historicisms and 
unhistoricisms. This is not to imply that such critical values are universally 
shared or uncontested, but that they have been obtained from and propounded 
out of distinct theoretical engagements.1 The field of queer studies has spent 
considerably less energy thinking about what it might mean to espouse or enact 
a queer method.2 Orgasmology, I submit, can help us do just that.
Jagose does not identify a methodological remit to her book, preferring 
instead to lay “a queer theoretical claim to orgasm” in the face of what she 
argues is “queer theory’s established dismissal of orgasm as a critical figure” 
(xii; emphasis mine). Neither “method” nor “methodology” appears in the 
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book’s index, suggesting that for her project they do not rise to the level of 
an organizing “concept.”3 Jagose’s only explicit remark on method appears in 
her Introduction’s second sentence where she describes “[t]he global roaming 
system that has been the nearest thing to a methodology that queer theory has 
espoused to date, the way its attraction to the abject, the subaltern, the eccen-
tric, and the minoritarian deems no subject so outré as to be altogether out of 
bounds” (1). Thus identifying the opportunistic, peripheral status of method in 
queer theory, this observation primarily provides the set-up for her explication 
of orgasm as the allegedly nugatory thing that queer theory has not thought 
important enough to theorize.
By focusing on what orgasm enjoins for the more mundane manufacture 
of method, and in using the work-a-day term “manufacture” to describe the 
labor involved, I propose that there may be analytical traction to be gained 
in exploring how queer studies approaches its research objects, as much as 
what it trains its attention on and why. Marking this distinction is by way of 
positing that, while theory and method may always be in implicit dialogue, 
queer studies has tended to collapse method into theory, substituting prevailing 
precepts (e.g., anti-identitarianism, anti-normativity) for a close examination 
of protocols and procedures. Countless discussions have considered what queer 
theory is (and is not) and what queer theory does (and should not do); few 
voices have centered their inquiry on how queer theory does what it does. In 
a field that vacillates between interdisciplinary and anti-disciplinary commit-
ments, this evasion of method has precipitated a default syntax that results in 
a conflation of what queer is, what its hoped for effects are, and the means by 
which it achieves them.
In her description of “the dismissal of orgasm as inadequately queer” (2013, 
2), Jagose critiques the presumptive knowledge of a field that is overly confident 
about its ability to assess the radical potential of any object or practice. Skepti-
cal about such claims, she refuses to “resolve orgasm into a critical term, the 
usability of which will be evidenced by its portability and scalability to other 
critical contexts” (xvi). Resisting the scaling up entailed in the production of 
new theories, she announces her intervention as a more modest effort to bring 
into focus an unlikely object: “sticking with orgasm promises to disrupt the 
consolidation of what can sometimes feel like queer theoretical complacencies 
around what objects or events deserve critical attention, around which types of 
sexual actors or sexual practices most counter normative values and institutions, 
around what selfhood, community, ethics, and politics look and feel like” (11).
Sticking with orgasm enjoins Jagose to train her sights on contradictions 
and impasses.4 The organizing thesis of Orgasmology concerns “the various ways 
orgasm might be understood . . . as a complexly contradictory formation” (xiii) as 
well as the purchase this “discursive ambivalence” (28) provides for disrupting 
“the sedimenting critical frameworks by which we have grown accustomed to 
apprehending sexuality” (xiii).5 According to Jagose, as a critical figure orgasm 
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“is biological and cultural, representable and unrepresentable,” “personal and 
impersonal,” “worldly and out of this world” (34). It “is also innate and acquired; 
voluntary and involuntary; mechanistic and psychological; literal and figura-
tive; trivial and precious; social and asocial; modern and postmodern; liberat-
ing and regulatory; an index for autonomy and self-actualization as well as for 
interpersonal and communal attachment; the epitome and the extinction of 
erotic pleasure; and indifferent and intrinsic to taxonomic categories of sexual 
difference and sexual orientation” (34). This contradictory status is not strictly 
formal, but historical and epistemological. Orgasm’s “contradictory charge,” 
she asserts, derives “from the historic processes whereby sexuality has come to 
constitute a framework of intelligibility for sex” (34). The incongruous impera-
tives that impart to orgasm its conceptual difficulty stem from the way sex is 
caught within the double binds of a distinctively modern system of knowing sex: 
“Orgasm’s structuring contradictions . . . are evidence of their intrinsic intimacy 
with the epistemological contours of modern sexuality” (34).6
It is here, where Jagose’s historicizing argument veers toward the episte-
mological,7 that it begins to gesture toward methodological protocols. When 
characterizing the contradictions animating orgasm as something that “cannot 
be explained away or even decisively arbitrated” (34), she signals that interpre-
tation must come to a temporary halt, must submit to being deferred and even 
subordinated to the less sexy mode of “simple” description. Such postponement 
responds to the recognition that the impasses she ponders are not subject to 
resolution—although the space they open may be generative of new formations. 
As she puts it, “Thinking the thingness of orgasm holds open a dialectic space 
for conceptual trade between the literal and the figural, the concrete and the 
ephemeral, the immanent and the transcendent. . .  . Thus orgasm might be 
dialectically understood to figure simultaneously a number of apparently con-
tradictory states or conditions that, far from being ordered by the neat logics 
of succession or even the clear-cut animosities of opposition, continue to play 
off of each other, intersecting with and counterinforming each other, taking 
on each other’s coloration in sometimes unexpected ways” (215). Chapter 1, 
for instance, reads “the contradictory temporalities of always and not yet” (71). 
Chapter 2 hones in on the “personalizing and impersonalizing effects of sex 
since modernity” (xiii). These effects, born of two contradictory regimes of 
“recognition” (104), are summoned by the incommensurate figures of the straight 
woman and the gay man, who are asymmetrically positioned via the frustrations 
of an all-too-privatized “female anorgasmia” and the sex-positive celebrations 
of “queer public sex culture” (xiv). Sticking with the double bind enacted by 
these incompatible figures directs the eye toward what they diacritically reveal 
about each other as well the fact that there is no viable choice between them. A 
gay male public culture of impersonal sex is no more the poster-child for queer 
world-making than is the woman who personalizes sex but never comes—or, 
as chapter 5 would have it, who fakes it.
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Jagose’s method, then, involves attending to the thingness of orgasm, 
suspending interpretation and judgment in favor of description, and using 
orgasm’s historicity to excavate the problems it poses for knowledge production. 
She approaches her critical object as an interpretative crux, but rather than 
attempting to unlock its hermeneutic secrets or explain its difficulties away, she 
uses its irresolvability as a critical resource.8 A consideration of her methods 
could lead us to various disciplinary fields and subfields: sociology, historicism, 
literary criticism, thing theory. Rather than trace these methods back to their 
origins or to their destinations in Jagose’s book, I wish to emphasize that her 
investment in working contradictions is a response to the problem of confront-
ing the unknowable in sex. It may seem obvious, but it is surprisingly little noted 
that the production of knowledge is generated, directed, and circumscribed by 
its objects of inquiry. If those objects are resistant to analysis, they necessarily 
confer onto the methods directed toward them certain priorities and parameters; 
the object, we might say, magnetizes the methods used to analyze it. Whereas 
some analytic strategies may transit across disciplines (just as concepts do) 
and be transferable to disparate objects, they are not infinitely mobile; it thus 
is worth scrutinizing when and where they hit up against limits, are stymied, 
or fall apart.
Several aspects of Jagose’s way of working contradictions to contend with 
the obduracy of orgasm are particularly striking. First, while her method is 
recognizably deconstructive, in its focus on impediments to legibility it offers 
concrete signposts and organizing principles useful for identifying significant 
research objects and generating good questions about them. She pursues not only 
internal dynamics, but also diacritical relations. And she does so by consider-
ing both synchronic and diachronic timeframes. Second, Jagose is unusually 
candid about the affective weight that her choice of method bears. Not only did 
she feel that in honing in on orgasm she was asking a “simple question”—one 
that carried the risk of “seeming naïve, even backward, about queer scholarly 
knowledges or codes of critical inquiry” (10)—but the longer she stuck with 
orgasm, “the lengthy period of sticking with sometimes felt less tenaciously, more 
traumatically, like being stuck” (xvii). A willingness to appear stupid, simple, and 
stuck is an intellectual disposition worth pondering, not only for its intrepid 
determination, but because it contravenes the affective and rhetorical conven-
tions of a field enamored of conceptual mastery and eager to issue reprimands 
whenever its participants venture out of bounds.
Jagose’s intellectual courage is mirrored by the boldness of her argument, 
which radically challenges the dominant boundaries of queer theory itself. Pre-
eminent among orgasm’s contradictions is that it is both materially embodied—a 
biological, physiological “event”—and cultural, representational, and ephem-
eral. Jagose is fully cognizant that “[t]he definition of orgasm as a bodily event 
. . . is often intended as a ground-clearing gesture that naturalizes orgasm by 
lodging it in the material reality of the body” (21). But if one desists from such 
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naturalization, recognition of orgasm’s materiality can enable rethinking “the 
relationship between sex as a set of bodily practices or techniques and sexual-
ity as a field, both psychic and regulatory” (15). This ontological duality has 
heavyweight implications, for the reorientation it demands necessitates “think-
ing the biological with, rather than against, the cultural” (28). “[T]here is no 
reason to presume that the cultural and the biological must be at loggerheads,” 
Jagose argues, “nor that an emphasis on the cultural will lend itself to the 
open-ended possibilities of transformation while an emphasis on the biological 
will as inevitably become bogged down in the inertia of the status quo” (28).9
Meaning, Jagose asserts, is “an effect of relationality, a recursive loop-
ing through systems that might well include the biochemical” (25). With the 
material and the cultural thus looping through one another, Jagose activates 
a more-interdisciplinary-than-usual queer archive, one that is extraordinary 
to the degree that it gestures toward the social and natural sciences.10 Its most 
sustained excursion into the natural sciences is its appreciative uptake of the 
work of Helen O’Connell, a neurologist whose anatomical studies of the cli-
toris and urethra demonstrate that the clitoris is far more complex, extensive, 
and neurologically replete than biologists previously assumed. Specifically, the 
clitoris is “a substantial three-dimensional structure extending across the peri-
neal region; . . . it is closely connected to the urethra and distal vagina; . . . the 
cavernous bulbs previously associated with the vagina are more properly part of 
the clitoral complex; and . . . the clitoris has a large and complex neurovascular 
supply” (Jagose 2013, 27). Jagose interprets O’Connell’s findings as suggesting 
“that the clitoris’s biological intimacies with not just the vagina but the urethra 
. . . might enable a full-scale abandonment of the psychomorphology that has, 
since classical and early modern medical mappings of the body, persistently 
divided female erotic capacities against themselves” (27). Desensitizing the 
allergy toward biology that has long dominated the humanities, she asserts 
that “a new biological model might facilitate altered cultural understandings” 
(28). More specifically, a
better grasp of the anatomical affinities and neurological relays among female 
genital organs might model new ways of intervening in the complex circuitry 
of sexual knowledges that underpins both dominant and resistant cultural and 
historical narratives about relations between the clitoris and the vagina and 
those further relations—between, for example, the civilized and the primitive, 
men and women, heterosexuals and homosexuals—that those organs have 
been taken to license. (28)
Jagose takes further steps toward the empirical sciences when examining 
the impulse to visualize orgasm in the mid-century sexology of Kinsey (for 
whom “orgasm makes sex countable” [29]) and Masters and Johnson (who 
famously charted human sexual response), as well as in contemporary medical 
imaging technology. Her analysis of how these forms of knowledge “grapple 
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with concerns about the authenticity of their representations” (161) does not 
so much contravene what humanists typically find objectionable about the 
quantification or schematization of sex,11 but instead demonstrates the surprising 
affinities of sexology and medicine with the conventions of film and porn: when 
it comes to sex, each of these discourses enacts an abiding ambivalence about 
the possibility of visibilizing the invisible.12 This leveling of sexual knowledges 
across incommensurate domains takes a more risky turn when Jagose gleans in 
the protocols of mid-century homophobic behavioral modification programs an 
understanding of orgasmic reconditioning that unexpectedly reveals a “queer 
trace” (106): behaviorism’s recognition that erotic fantasy cannot be directly 
correlated to erotic practice and that sex is “a behavior unindexed to any broader 
characterological system” (134).
In identifying such similarities, no less than in using biological science as 
a basis from which to assess orgasm’s theoretical potential, Jagose steps beyond 
the conflicts between social scientists and humanists which, as described by 
Heather Love, “turn on the question of whether the empirical study of sexuality 
should be understood as social recognition or as epistemological violence” (2015, 
76–77). In her book’s final sentence, Jagose affirms that “our understandings of 
twentieth-century orgasm, no less our fleshly experiences of it, are equally strung 
on the warp of figuration as the weft of literality” (215). The weft of literality, 
that is, provides half the raw material from which queer deconstructions of 
figuration, representation, and politics emerge.
Jagose’s effort to move beyond a reactive hostility to empiricism implicitly 
registers that what we call “queer theory” has been defined by means of certain 
disciplinary-specific conventions. This is not merely to say that important voices 
are often excluded from the field’s charmed circle, but that some foundational 
work is regularly misrecognized as less empirically grounded than it actually 
is.13 Given this, the methodological rapprochement of Orgasmology could be 
extended even further to invite a more reciprocal cross-disciplinary conversa-
tion. What, for instance, would the scholarship of queer, feminist psychologists 
who investigate, often through hybrid qualitative and quantitative methods, the 
relation of orgasm to concepts of sexual satisfaction (as well as the metrics by 
which such satisfaction is appraised) add to the theoretical questions broached 
by Jagose?14 In the work of such psychologists, orgasm, it seems, has for a while 
been “substantialized . . . as a node of critical attention” (9) in ways it has not 
been in queer theory; moreover, these psychologists do not, as queer theory 
has, “transubstantiate” “sex into matter deemed more immediately or more 
recognizably political” (13). In seeking to explore the varied definitions of “sex” 
available in contemporary culture, their concern is to do justice to its lability, 
heterogeneity, and multi-dimensionality, which often means its incoherence 
and illegibility. Indeed, they have been on the forefront of asking what “having 
sex” means, and they have faced the ensuing chaos with remarkable equanim-
ity, using it to reconsider what extreme variability and contradiction means 
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for the way they conduct their research—in other words, how it might impact 
their methods.15 How, then, might these queer feminist researchers affirm, 
nuance, or challenge the ways in which orgasm is historicized, anatomized, and 
appropriated on behalf of queer theory?
By raising this question, I do not fault Jagose for the selectivity of her 
archive or for the fact that assessment of what counts as an improbable research 
object may itself be subject to disciplinary norms; rather, I would maintain that 
disciplinarity prejudicially informs the very meaning of what can be perceived 
or adduced as a queer theoretical intervention. Nor do I contend that the 
natural and social sciences could not learn much from Jagose’s achievement 
in showcasing orgasm’s opacity, recalcitrance, and resistance to conceptual 
closure. Far from it. The epistemological stakes are especially keen in Jagose’s 
analysis of fake orgasm. Arguing that this practice, indexically associated with 
heterosexual women, emerged historically out of the incongruity between the 
sexual incompatibility of the heterosexual couple and increased pressure for 
them to achieve relations of parity and reciprocity, she reads fake orgasm as, 
simultaneously, a signifier of heterosexuality’s failure, a historically specific 
strategy by which it is endlessly renewed, and a counterdisciplinary “disposition” 
(205)—that is, a “sexual innovation” that “strategically refuse[s] the regula-
tory system of sexuality” (188). Jagose frames her reassessment of fake orgasm 
in terms of “a queer theoretical approach that testifies to the potential of the 
unintelligible, the unproductive, and the wasteful” (xv). This emphasis would 
find common cause not with the goals of queer or feminist psychology (which 
seek to maximize human flourishing) but with their often-disavowed progenitor, 
psychoanalysis, which assumes as a matter of course the tendency of knowledge 
to fall short, hit a wall, and fail.16
Crucially, the potential benefits of a methodological dialogue between 
psychologists, psychoanalytic scholars, and queer theorists would accrue not 
only to those disciplines that aspire to the status of science. Indeed, Jagose 
implies that something important is at stake for queer theory in reconsidering 
its “near-axiomatic understandings of what constitutes, politically speaking, 
good sex and bad” (177). As she notes, “[W]hat we want from sex is never, it 
seems, fake orgasm .  .  . [which] has many practitioners but few champions” 
(178). To the extent that fake orgasm is a matter of “making do” (194), it fosters 
awareness of the fact that sex, for some people, is a matter of disappointment 
and displeasure. Irrespective of political claims on behalf of any sexual practice, 
queer theory might further exploit the conceptual payoff of bad sex by including 
within its sphere of attention sex that is frustrating, dissatisfying, even aversive 
(the domain more often relegated to psychology and psychotherapy)—for it is 
out of these affective states, and the quotidian adjustments they require, that 
queer worlds also emerge.17
Jagose is circumspect in her claims for orgasmology, whose very coinage as 
a term is, as she puts it, “implausible” (37). Noting at the onset “the absence of a 
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field of anything like orgasm studies,” she does not “bewail the absence of such 
a field nor still less” does she “propose to inaugurate one” (xii): “I’m not calling 
for orgasm as the grounding figure for a new political, theoretical schema or 
a new way of inhabiting the world. . . . I’m not offering it as yet another criti-
cal figure around which we can rally differently than the last figure we rallied 
differently around” (xvi). Much as I appreciate her disinclination to make a 
grandiose gesture, I would counter that orgasmology—the study of orgasm as 
an intractable object at once biological, material, cultural, affective, ephemeral, 
and political—could facilitate future consideration of what queer method is and 
what it does. The point is not necessarily to determine which strategies are par-
ticularly queer—such definitional pursuits, prone as they are to descending into 
territorial disputes, may have limited use-value—but rather what it might mean 
to claim them as queer. What kinds of analytical, affective, and political work 
do such claims entail? And how might these claims be validated substantively 
rather than simply promulgated rhetorically? Despite queer studies’ tendency to 
set itself apart from and in opposition to the disciplines, its methods may share 
much in common with those that comfortably reside within disciplinary homes.
The interdisciplinarity that informs Orgasmology takes its bearings not only 
from the improbabilities of its obdurate object, but from the incommensurabili-
ties that attend the conjuncture of different disciplinary fields as they wrestle, 
together and apart, with the impossibilities of sexual knowledge. In this, the 
book offers a model for revisiting the principled anti-disciplinarity and correla-
tive suspicion of expertise that has long characterized queer theory—something 
that, as others have argued, can serve as a screen for territorial rivalries between 
the humanities and the social sciences.18 Orgasmology helps us see that an 
interdisciplinary practice well informed about, but not submissive to, scientific 
expertise can offer new bases for engagement around sex, including enhanced 
ability to ascertain which questions are worth asking. This is not to excuse or 
condone the manifold problems with positivism; it is to suggest that in light 
of post-positivist revisions by feminist and queer social scientists, a knee-jerk 
dismissal of empiricism is beside the point. In her embrace of description and 
her patient regard for orgasm as a critical object, Jagose performs one of the 
distinctive values of the social sciences while making vividly clear that stick-
ing with an object’s recalcitrance may lead to something far more interesting 
than epistemological capture—indeed, it may lead to something quite queer.
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Notes
1. Debates about anti-sociality are well known and debates about historicism and 
unhistoricism increasingly so. For the most recent debate regarding normativity and 
antinormativity, see Wiegman and Wilson 2015. Their turn to statistics is relevant to 
the argument below.
2. For more on the productive differences between theory and method as well as on 
the intractability of sexual knowledge, see Traub 2015. Interest in method is beginning 
to be noted. See the special issue of Women’s Studies Quarterly 44:3–4 (2016) co-edited 
by Matt Brim and Amin Ghaziani on “Queer Method”; the CFP for this issue, which 
sought contributions across the humanities and social sciences, confidently begins, 
“Queer Studies is experiencing a methodological renaissance”; see https://call-for-papers 
.sas.upenn.edu/node/61540.
3. My use of “concept” is indebted to Mieke Bal (2002).
4. Whereas this method derives from Jagose’s apprehension of orgasm’s status as 
incoherent, it also describes the method employed in Inconsequence (2002), where she 
“stuck with” the figure of the lesbian, working with and through the tensions between 
gender and sexuality, gay men and lesbians, visibility and invisibility, and consequence 
and inconsequence.
5. In this, Jagose seems heir to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (1990, 2003), who often 
focused her deconstructive lens on the mutually constitutive dynamics between two 
key concepts: not just the hetero and the homo rubrics of sexual definition, but the 
homosexual and homosocial, the minoritizing and universalizing, the gender transitive 
and gender intransitive, and in later work, the paranoid and reparative.
6. Jagose’s recourse to periodization serves more as a convenient demarcation than 
a rigorously argued comparison. Earlier regimes of sex, not caught within the tentacles 
of subjective desire or sexual identity, also pose their own difficulties for knowledge and 
require similar epistemological attention.
7. Jagose distances her method from that of cultural history: “Far from produc-
ing a cultural history of orgasm in the twentieth-century . .  . I am interested in the 
ways twentieth-century orgasm cannot be persuaded to pull itself together in a single 
authorizing narrative” (34). Although Orgasmology is not rigorously contextualizing or 
comprehensive according to the protocols of cultural history, I would suggest that not 
all cultural history is intent on producing “a single authorizing narrative.”
8. For similar strategies, see Masten 2016.
9. To Jagose’s citation of Elizabeth Wilson, I would add Elizabeth Grosz (2004), 
who makes feminist alliance with Darwin; Vernon Rosario (2009, 268), who argues 
“for an analytics of gender and sexuality that takes the social and the biological seri-
ously by acknowledging the complexity and depth of both influences”; Sari van Anders 
(2015), who presents a new theory of sexual orientation that aims to bridge the gulf 
between neuroendocrinology and queer politics; and Tobin Siebers (2009), who insists 
on complicating the social construction of disability by confrontation with the material 
facticity of the body.
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10. Wiegman and Wilson correctly observe that “queer inquiry has been far less 
interested in exploring the disciplinary orientations that craft its conceptual use of 
norms and normativity than in positing the disciplines themselves as institutionalized 
forces of normalization. Instead, a critique of the disciplines tout court has become cen-
tral to the field’s antinormative self-description, generating the now pervasive claim that 
interdisciplinarity is itself among the field’s most valued antinormative transgressions” 
(2015, 6). My point, however, is that the specific forms that queer interdisciplinarity can 
take have been defensively circumscribed in what increasingly looks like a proleptic 
guarding, in the manner of Sedgwick’s paranoid reading, against surprise.
11. See Mary Poovey’s influential critique of the sex survey (1998). For thought-
ful analyses of empirical methods from the standpoint of queer sociology, see Steven 
Epstein (2006, 2011).
12. The analysis of orgasm’s resistance to visibilization has affinities with Jagose 
(2002) on the analytical and political limits of lesbian visibility.
13. See Gayle Rubin’s defense of empiricism, especially in terms of history, sexology, 
and the sociology of deviance (2011).
14. See McClelland (2010, 2011, 2014). On queer theory’s impact on qualitative 
social science, see Gamson 2000. In its recognition that methods are a crucial aspect 
of knowledge production and that they vary based on the research question, social sci-
ence offers queer studies a protocol of self-reflexivity from which it could usefully draw.
15. See Sanders and Reinisch 1999; and Sanders et al. 2010.
16. Knowledge in psychoanalysis is understood as developing through anxiety, 
resistance, refusal, dependence, disavowal, hate, frustration, and abjection, as well as 
by identification, desire, attachment, gratitude, fantasy, pleasure, and love. In the words 
of Deborah Britzman, “[P]sychoanalysis reminds one of the failure of knowledge, the 
work of forgetting, the elusiveness of significance, the incidental, the coincident, the 
bungled action, and the psychic creativity of selves” (1998, 10).
17. On affective adjustment, see Berlant 2011.
18. As Love notes, “While queer studies has understood itself alternatively as inter-
disciplinary and as antidisciplinary, frequent dismissals of social science methodologies 
and epistemologies undermine such claims—and show up the radicalism of the queer 
break with academic norms as a familiar form of disciplinary rivalry” (2015, 77).
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